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Survey of Attack Projection, Prediction, and
Forecasting in Cyber Security
Martin Husák, Jana Komárková, Elias Bou-Harb, and Pavel Čeleda
Abstract—This paper provides a survey of prediction, and
forecasting methods used in cyber security. Four main tasks
are discussed first, attack projection and intention recognition,
in which there is a need to predict the next move or the
intentions of the attacker, intrusion prediction, in which there is
a need to predict upcoming cyber attacks, and network security
situation forecasting, in which we project cybersecurity situation
in the whole network. Methods and approaches for addressing
these tasks often share the theoretical background and are often
complementary. In this survey, both methods based on discrete
models, such as attack graphs, Bayesian networks, and Markov
models, and continuous models, such as time series and grey
models, are surveyed, compared, and contrasted. We further
discuss machine learning and data mining approaches, that have
gained a lot of attention recently and appears promising for such
a constantly changing environment, which is cyber security. The
survey also focuses on the practical usability of the methods and
problems related to their evaluation.
Index Terms—Cyber security, intrusion detection, situational
awareness, prediction, forecasting, model checking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is a broad field of research, and the detection
of malicious activities on the network is among the oldest and
most common problems [1]. However, intrusion detection is
mostly reactive and responses to specific patterns or observed
anomalies. The intuitive next step is taking a proactive ap-
proach, in which there is a need to preemptively infer the
upcoming malicious activities so that we could react to such
events before they cause any harm [2]. Research efforts and
progress in predictions and forecasting in cyber security are
not as prominent as attack detection. However, it is gaining
more attention, and a breakthrough in this field would benefit
the whole discipline of cyber security [1].
Before we can start making predictions about cyber security,
there is a need to examine what can actually be predicted and
what obstacles are there that make this problem hard. First, if
there is an attack taking place, it is possible to predict its next
steps. Such a task is called attack projection [3]. A similar task
is intention recognition [4], in which we also estimate what is
the ultimate goal of an adversary, which can also help us in
predicting adversary’s next moves. Another task is predicting
cyber attacks that are going to happen. In this case, we talk
about intrusion prediction [5], although we can use similar
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Brno, Czech Republic (email: husakm@ics.muni.cz; komarkova@ics.muni.cz;
celeda@ics.muni.cz).
Elias Bou-Harb is with the Cyber Threat Intelligence Laboratory, Florida
Atlantic University, 777 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA (email:
ebouharb@fau.edu).
approaches to predict also vulnerabilities. Finally, we might
be interested in overall statistics of attacks, the presence of
threats, and other pieces of information that together form
a network security situation. In this context, we talk about
network security situation forecasting [6]. Numerous methods
and system were proposed to approach these problems, and
as we point out in this survey, they often share a common
theoretical background, which makes the particular tasks and
use cases similar to each other.
To summarize the open problems, we emphasize the fol-
lowing research challenges of predictions and forecasting in
cyber security:
• What can be predicted in a cyber security domain?
Is it the next move of an adversary, appearance of a
new attacker, or cyber security situation from a global
perspective?
• How usable are the predictions in cyber security? Can
they be used to effectively mitigate an attack or to get
prepared for an upcoming security threat?
• How to evaluate predictions in cyber security and what
metrics should be used? Is it sufficient to rely on evalua-
tion using datasets and testbeds or can the actual predic-
tion accuracy be measured in a live network setting?
To this end, such research challenges impact both theoretical
and practical perspectives. In this survey, we postulate if pre-
dictions and forecasts are possible, and we are also interested
in the applicability and evaluation of the theoretical results.
A. Paper Organization
This paper is divided into nine sections. Section II intro-
duces the main use cases of predictive and forecasting methods
in cyber security. Taxonomy of attack prediction methods is
presented in Section III. A literature review of methods of
cyber attack prediction is presented in Sections IV–VII with
a detailed explanation of the methods. Section VIII discusses
evaluation of attack prediction and lessons learned. Finally,
Section IX concludes the paper and provides an outlook on
future research.
This paper is intended for an audience familiar with com-
puter networks and cyber attacks. Nevertheless, the tasks and
use cases of attack prediction, projection, and forecasting are
defined in Section II, so the reader does not need to be
an expert in the field. Probably the most interesting part of
this survey can be found in Sections III–VII. A taxonomy
in Section III provides a high-level view of the discussed
methods. Sections IV–VII contain theoretical background and
list of recent literature for each group of methods. There is
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also a table included in each of the four sections (Tables II–
V) that summarizes all the prediction method. If a paper listed
in the table is discussed in the text, it is distinguished by
the author name(s) in italic. Selected papers are highlighted
with a gray background in the table and announced in the
text as recommended reading. Practitioners are advised to
read Section VIII that contains practical implications and open
problems in the field.
B. Literature Search Methodology
A literature search for this survey covered many journals
and conference proceedings. Although the discussed problems
are studied in the field of cyber security, the topics are often
addressed in journals and conferences on computer networks
and communications. Due to the specific nature of this work,
we also had to go through journals and conferences dedicated
to formal methods in computer science, such as expert systems
and their applications, which appeared to be an important
source of papers for this survey.
First, we reviewed survey-oriented journals like IEEE Com-
munication Surveys and Tutorials and ACM Computing Sur-
veys, although no survey was found to discuss predictions in
cyber security. Subsequently, we used Google Scholar, IEEE
Xplore, and ACM Digital Library to search for related papers
using the queries “cyber security” AND “prediction”, “cyber
security” AND “attack projection”, “cyber security” AND
“forecasting”. Further, we looked for publications citing or
cited by already found works or having the same author. The
publications are presented in chronological order from 2012 to
2018. Papers published prior to 2012 are not included in this
survey unless they pose fundamental contribution or are still
highly relevant. The numbers of citations assessed by Google
Scholar and Scopus were used to identify the most influential
research papers.
C. Existing Surveys
To the best of our knowledge, prediction and forecasting
methods in cyber security were not surveyed in such scope
yet, although several surveys of particular tasks and use
cases were published in recent years. Wei and Jiang [7]
in 2013 analyzed the problem of network security situation
prediction and compared predictions of NSSA using neural
networks, time series, and support vector machines, although
mostly to illustrate the limitations of the available methods.
Yang et al. [3] formalized the task of attack projection and
surveyed literature on the topic in 2014. Three categories are
listed, prediction based on attack plans, estimates of attackers
capabilities and intentions, and predictions by learning attack
patterns and attacker’s behavior. Leau and Manickam [6] in
2015 surveyed several existing techniques of network security
situation forecasting. They grouped them into three categories
by their theoretical background: machine learning, Markov
models, and Grey theory. In 2016, Gheyas and Abdallah [8]
surveyed detection and prediction of insider threats. Although
this topic is still of interest, the predictive approaches do not
seem to be studied in recent years. Ramaki and Atani [2]
surveyed early warning systems, which often use predictive
analytics, although these are not discussed much in details. A
simple yet usable taxonomy of intrusion prediction methods
can also be found in a paper by Abdlhamed et al. [9]. The
authors first split related work into two groups, predictions
methods and intrusion detection enhancement. The prediction
methods are categorized into three groups, methods using
Hidden Markov models, methods based on Bayesian networks,
and genetic algorithms. Subsequently, they classify artificial
neural networks, data mining, and algorithmic methodologies
as three enhancements for intrusion detection, which enhance
the effectiveness of prediction systems. The same authors later
published a survey of intrusion prediction [5], in which they
categorize prediction methodologies and prediction systems.
Prediction methodologies can be based on alert correlation,
sequences of actions, statistical and probabilistic methods, and
feature extraction. Prediction systems are then categorized as
based on hidden Markov models, Bayesian networks, genetic
algorithms, neural networks, data mining, and algorithmic
methods. Recently, Ahmed and Zaman [4] surveyed methods
of attack intention recognition, a field dominated by meth-
ods based on graphical models. The authors recognize four
categories: causal networks, path analysis, graphical models,
and dynamic Bayesian networks. Methods based on causal
networks were evaluated as the most effective.
II. USE CASES OF PREDICTION AND FORECASTING IN
CYBER SECURITY
From the surveyed research papers, we distilled several tasks
that pose a use case of prediction or forecasting in cyber
security. The tasks are summed up in Table I. Historically,
the first such use cases are the attack projection [3] and
the attack intention recognition [4], which are closely tied to
intrusion detection. The task is to predict what is an attacker
(in an already observed attack) going to do next, and what is
attacker’s ultimate goal [4]. In practice, these two tasks use
very similar methods, and can often be used interchangeably.
Later, the task of predicting attacks emerged [5]. This task is
more general as it does not require observation of a preceding
activity. The expected outcome is a prediction of an attack
before it actually occurs, not predicting a continuation of an
observed series of events. Finally, the task of forecasting a
security situation [6] is a highly generic use case related to
cyber situational awareness. The task is not to predict an at-
tack, but rather forecast the situation in the whole network [2].
The outcomes may be a forecast of increase or decrease in
the number of attacks or vulnerabilities in the network. The
following subsections discuss the use cases in more details.
A. Attack Projection and Intention Recognition
The initial idea of attack projection dates back to 2001
when Geib and Goldman [10] proposed attack projection
as an extension of attack plan recognition and identified its
prerequisites and possible problems, such as a need to work
with unobserved actions, failure to observe, and consideration
of multiple concurrent goals. First methods started to appear
around 2003 [11], [12] and the research in this field is still




Use case Task description Previous surveys
Attack projection What is an adversary go-
ing to do next?
Yang et al. [3]
Attack intention
recognition






What type of attack will





How is the overall situa-
tion going to evolve?
Leau and Man-
ickam [6]
To project the continuation of an attack and predict the
upcoming events, we typically need to document the behavior
of the attackers and establish a description of an attack for
later use. Sample anatomy of a cyber attack was given by





iv. Elevation of Privilege
v. Perform Malicious Tasks
vi. Deploy Malware/Backdoor
vii. Delete Forensic Evidence and Exit
Many types of cyber attacks follow this simple sequence of
events, which can be observed either in the network traffic or
on the target system, where intrusion detection systems may
be found. The projection of an ongoing attack is, in essence,
very simple. If we see a sequence of events that fit an attack
model, we may assume that the attack will continue according
to the model. Thus, we predict the adversary’s next step.
Nevertheless, vague description of an attack is not usable for
algorithmic predictions and, thus, more formal description of
an attack is required, e.g., in the form of an attack graph [11].
Further, many different types of attacks exist, so there is a
need to create a model for all the attacks that are going to be
projected. Historically, the first methods depended on attack
libraries [12] that had to be manually filled, which requires
substantial effort and continuous updates [3]. Thus, modern
methods more often rely on data mining to automatically
generated attack patterns for attack projections [14], [15].
A basic idea behind attack intention recognition is similar
to attack projection; the difference is in motivation. In attack
projection, we are not that interested in an attacker’s intentions.
If an ultimate goal of an adversary is estimated, the predictions
of future malicious events may be suited more to the particular
attack. Attacker’s intention recognition is studied in network
forensics [4], where it was originally performed over historical
data. However, novel approaches are focused on real-time
intention recognition and are becoming more and more similar
to attack projection.
B. Intrusion Prediction
A more general task predicting cyber attacks, mostly in-
trusions [5]. Instead of projecting an already observed attack,
we are interested in predicting novel attacks. Minor variations
of the task also include predictions of vulnerabilities, attack
propagation and multi-stage attacks, and other cyber security
events. There is also a significant overlap with research on
early warning systems [2], which pose a practical use case for
prediction in cyber security in general.
Due to the task being too generic, there are not many
common elements in the proposed approaches. While attack
projection mostly relied on discrete models of cyber attacks,
there is a plethora of methods and models used for attack
prediction ranging from discrete models, e.g., attack graphs,
to continuous models, e.g., time series. Thus, one may predict
the attacks using the same discrete models that used for attack
projection, with only a small variation in prediction start.
For example, the prediction may not start with an already
observed malicious event, but rather with a probability that
a particular vulnerability in the network will be exploited. An
example of an approach based on a continuous model is a time
series representing a number of attacks on a certain system or
network in time. The time series may then be used to predict
if an attack is going to happen or not. Advanced methods may
calculate with types of attacks and characteristics of attackers
and victims, so that they may estimate what type of attack
is going to happen, who is going to an attacker, and who is
going to be the victim. Recent approaches often include non-
technical data sources in the predictions so that we may see
methods based on sentiment analysis on social networks [16],
[17] or changes in user behavior [18], thus overcoming the
“unpredictability” of cyber attacks.
C. Network Security Situation Forecasting
The last main use case of predictions and forecasting in
cyber security is the forecasting of a global security situation.
Instead of focusing on an individual attacker or an ongoing
attack, there is a need to know what is a holistic state of an
information system or a network under our control. This use
case of cyber security prediction was briefly surveyed by Leau
and Manickam [6].
A key concept of a holistic view on cyber security is often
referenced as cyber situational awareness (CSA) or network
security situational awareness (NSSA). Both terms originate
in the general term situational awareness that originates in
military research. One of the most widely used definitions of
situational awareness is the one by Endsley [19]: “Perception
of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection
of their status in near future.” The definition itself emphasizes
three levels, perception, comprehension, and projection, as
illustrated on Figure 1 [20]. When applied in the cyber security
field, perception corresponds to monitoring of cyber systems
as well as intrusion detection. Comprehension corresponds
to the understanding of the cyber security situation, in our
case represented by modeling of cyber threats or correlating
security alerts. Finally, projection, as understood in the context
of this paper, is an action of predicting the changes in a
cyber security situation [3]. As we can see, the importance of
projection is rooted deep in the theoretical background of the
situational awareness [21] and thus, motivates the research on

















Fig. 1. Levels of situational awareness [20].
in attack projections presented earlier, where the projection is
seen only as an extension of intrusion detection.
Most of the works use quantitative analysis to describe the
network security situation at a point in time. The resulting
values are then projected into the future. Such an approach
does not provide any information about the exact nature of
future attacks. However, it can supply warnings about general
increase or decline of network security in future. The quanti-
tative approach allows for efficient application of methods for
analysis and projection that have been thoroughly researched
in the context of other fields. The quantitative analysis requires
a measure for evaluation of a network security situation.
There is no established canonical measure for assessing net-
work security situation. However, there are two prevalent
approaches: hierarchical method with additive weights and
attack intensity estimation method. The hierarchical method
evaluates the network security situation bottom up. Initially, a
security situation is measured for each host. Subsequently, the
values for each host are multiplied by a weight of the host and
summed up to compute the overall security of the network. The
actual method for estimating host security varies by author.
The weight usually expresses the importance of the host. The
attack intensity approach fuses information about the ongoing
attacks from diverse sources and estimates an overall attack
intensity. The overall intensity is derived from the number and
severity of attacks against the whole network. The prediction
can then give a warning about incoming increase or recess
of attacks. Note that since the input, as well as the predicted
value, are numeric, most of the models used for prediction of
network security situation falls into the category of continuous
models.
III. TAXONOMY AND METRICS OF PREDICTION METHODS
IN CYBER SECURITY
This section presents a taxonomy of attack prediction
methods. There are several approaches for categorizing the
methods, ranging from use cases to mathematical background.
Related surveys were mostly focused on a single use case, such
as attack projection or network security situation forecasting.
We decided not to categorized the methods by their use case
but instead on their theoretical background, thus highlighting
the similarities between the methods solving different tasks.
Nevertheless, the use cases of particular research works are
explained in their descriptions. The resulting taxonomy of
attack prediction methods is illustrated in Figure 2.
First, we categorize the methods by the theoretical back-
ground they use as a basis for prediction. Typically, a pre-
dictive method in cyber security uses a model to represent
an attack or network security situation. Clear examples are
graphical models of attack progression or game-theoretical
representation of attacker-defender interaction. Approaches
based on these discrete model formed the first category of
methods. In contrary, the network security situation might
be represented via a continuous mathematical model, e.g., a
time series or a grey model, that are excellent for forecast-
ing. The second category of methods thus contains methods
based on continuous models. Both categories contain several
subcategories, each representing a particular model. The third
category of predictive and forecasting methods contains the
methods based on machine learning and data mining. A
common characteristic of such methods is that they include
the learning phase, i.e., creating the knowledge base for
further predictions. It is worth noticing that several model-
based approaches used data mining to create a model before
making predictions [14], [15]. However, data mining plays
only a supporting role in such cases so that these methods
do not qualify for the machine learning and data mining
category. Finally, the fourth category contains methods that
are either very specific or otherwise hard to categorize. For
example, predictions of DDoS attack volume and predictions
based on sentiment analysis on social media are very specific
and use unique methods in the context of this work. The
fourth category further includes a group of similarity-based
approaches, which are unfortunately highly fragmented, and a
group of methods based on evolutionary computing, which
emerged very recently and thus it is too soon to properly
categorize it.
Apart from the theoretical background, we are interested in
the input data that are used for predictions. There are multiple
available data sources with different levels of abstraction. A
method can work with raw data, such as network traffic and
system logs, or with the abstract data, such alerts generated
by intrusion detection systems or numerical representation of
network security situation. Further, for the needs of evaluation
of the methods, the data can be either available as a dataset
or gathered from a live environment. Such information are
contained in taxonomy but can be found in the Tables II–V.
IV. METHODS BASED ON DISCRETE MODELS
The first group of cyber attack prediction methods is using
discrete models. In this section, we discuss methods using
graph models, such as attack graphs, Bayesian networks, and
Markov models. An alternative approach is based on game
theory. A summary of methods and research papers discussed
in this section can be found in Table II.
A. Attack Graphs
An attack graph is a graphical representation of an at-
tack scenario that was introduced in 1998 by Phillips and
Swiler [46] and quickly became a popular method of formal
representation of attacks. Thus, the first attack prediction
methods were based upon attack graphs. The attack graphs
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Fig. 2. Taxonomy of attack prediction and forecasting methods.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF PREDICTION METHODS, PART I – APPROACHES BASED ON DISCRETE MODELS.
Attack Graphs (Section IV-A)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Hughes and Sheyner [11] 2003 Attack graph Proof-of-concept The first proposed methods
Chung et al. [22] (NICE) 2013 Attack graph Testbed Part of countermeasure selection tool
Kotenko and Chechulin [23]
(CAMIAC)
2013 Attack graph Proof-of-concept Part of impact assessment tool
Cao et al. [24], [25] 2014-
2015
Attack graph Live 75 % accuracy, factor graph
Ramaki et al. [26] (RTECA) 2014 Attack graph DARPA 2000 95 % accuracy
GhasemiGol et al. [27], [28] 2016 Attack graph Proof-of-concept Scalable for large-scale networks
Polatidis et al. [29], [30] 2017-
2018
Attack graph Proof-of-concept Recommender system
Bayesian Networks (Section IV-B)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Qin and Lee [12] 2004 Causal network DARPA GCP Fundamental work on attack projection
Wu et al. [31] 2012 Bayesian network - Only model extensions
Ramaki et al. [32] 2015 Bayesian attack graph DARPA 2000 92.3–99.2 % accuracy, real-time
Okutan et al. [33] 2017 Bayesian network Live 63%–99% accuracy, non-conventional signals
Huang et al. [34] 2018 Bayesian network Testbed
(cyber-physical)
Application in a larger framework
Markov Models (Section IV-C)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Farhadi et al. [15] 2011 Hidden Markov model DARPA 2000 81.33 %–98.3 % accuracy, data mining,
illustrative example of a real-time attack
projection framework
Sendi et al. [35] 2012 Hidden Markov model DARPA 2000 Prediction of next step in multi-step attack
Shin et al. [36] (APAN) 2013 Markov chain DARPA 2000 Improving intrusion detection by predictions
Zhang et al. [37] 2014 Hidden Markov model DARPA 2000 Improvements in theoretical background
Kholidy et al. [38], [39], [40] 2014 Hidden Markov model,
Variable-order Markov model
DARPA 2000 Timing metric – predicts an attack coming in 39
minutes
Abraham and Nair [41] 2015 Markov model Testbed Exploitability analysis, vulnerability life-cycle
Bar et al. [42], [43] 2016 Markov chain Live (honeypot) Large-scale attack propagation models
Game Theory (Section IV-D)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Lisý et al. [44] 2012 Game theory Virtual attacks 38.6 % accuracy
Pı́bil et al. [45] 2012 Game theory Comparison with
naive algorithms
Extensions of previous works
Abdlhamed et al. [9] 2016 Game theory, time series DARPA 1999 Combined approach
also served as a basis for other model-checking approaches,
e.g., methods using Bayesian networks and Markov models
and game-theoretical methods.
1) Method Description: An attack graph (often abbreviated
as AG) is a tuple G = (S, r, S0, Ss), where S is a set of
states, r ⊆ S × S is a transition relation, S0 ⊆ S is a set
of initial states, and Ss ⊆ S is a set of success states [47].
The initial state represents the state before the attack starts.
Transition relations represent possible actions of an attacker.
These are usually weighted, e.g., by the probability that the
attacker will choose the action. If an attacker takes all the
actions to transition from the initial state to any of the success
states, the attack is successful, as the success state represents
a system compromise.
As stated earlier, an attack graph is constructed either
manually or automatically; a popular approach is using data
mining to generate attack graphs [14]. An example of an
attack graph is shown in Figure 3. In the nodes, we can see
possible events that comprise an attack. Edge values represent
a probability, by which the event associated with the end node
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Fig. 3. Example of exploit-oriented attack graph with predictability values
(inspired by [14]).
The predictions using attack graphs are based on traversing
the graph and searching for a successful attack path, or on
probability values of edges in the graph. Assuming a current
attack is in a certain state according to the model, the node is
marked as an initial state. From the initial state, all the possible
paths may be traversed, e.g., using breadth-first search, and the
ones leading to successful system compromise are selected as
possible attack paths. The weights might be used to predict
the most probable path. Alternatively, the most probable action
of an attacker may be considered in each node, which might
predict the immediate action of the attacker, but there the
attack path may not lead to a successful compromise.
2) Literature Review: Attack graphs were the first method
proposed for predicting cyber attacks, dating back to an essay
by Hughes and Sheyner published in 2003 [11]. Many research
papers that propose using the attack graphs, mostly for attack
projection and intent recognition, were published in years
2005-2008. Recent additions are listed in this section.
In 2013, two alert correlation frameworks, in which predic-
tion is involved, were proposed. Chung et al. [22] presented
NICE, a system for countermeasure selection in virtual net-
work systems, that uses attack graphs to model and project
the attacks. Kotenko and Chechulin [23] presented CAMIAC,
a system for cyber attack modeling and impact assessment,
where the attack graphs are used in a similar way. However,
both systems use attack projection as a part of a larger system,
and the research works do not focus on it.
Another variant of attack graphs is a factor graph proposed
by Cao et al. [24], [25] in 2014. A factor graph is a probabilis-
tic graphical model consisting of random variables and factor
functions. The authors compare it to Bayesian networks and
Markov random fields and evaluate the use of factor graph for
predicting attacks over a large dataset of real security incidents
(several years of reports) with a promising accuracy of 75 %.
Ramaki et al. [26] in 2014 proposed RTECA (Real Time
Episode Correlation Algorithm) for multi-step attack scenarios
detection and prediction. The paper describes in details the
theoretical and practical implications of designing such a tool.
Although they propose leveraging attack graph, the authors
extensively use causal correlations in their approach. Thus, in
their later work, Ramaki et al. [32] dropped the attack graphs
in favor of Bayesian networks (see Section IV-B for more
details).
GhasemiGol et al. [27] in 2016 introduced an uncertainty-
aware attack graph to evaluate network security state and a
forecasting attack graph to estimate the risk of future attacks.
The forecasting attack graph is built using several other graphs
- uncertainty-aware attack graph, hyper-alerts graph (for alert
correlation as in [48]), dependency graph, and response graph.
Although the attack graphs and probabilities have to be prede-
fined, they are continuously updated in reaction to incoming
alerts. The authors describe the process of graph generation
in details and provide an impressive amount of examples,
illustrations, and algorithms, which makes the paper very
interesting as an introductory paper to the field. The authors
also used many tools proposed in earlier works to assess their
usability. The same authors also proposed attack graph-based
attack prediction as a part of their work on incident response
management [28].
Polatidis et al. [29], [30] proposed an approach to cyber
attack prediction using attack graphs and recommender sys-
tems. First, an attack graph is built using the information about
infrastructure. Subsequently, a recommender system is used to
predict cyber attacks using a collaborative filtering approach
that the authors proposed earlier [49]. The papers include a
case study of attack graph generation in critical infrastructure,
specifically maritime supply chain.
B. Bayesian Networks
Another group of model-checking approach to attack pre-
diction is using Bayesian networks. These methods are closely
related to model-checking approaches based on attack graphs
because a Bayesian network is typically constructed from an
attack graph. The distinct feature of Bayesian networks are the
conditional variables and probabilities that are reflected in the
model. In some cases, further restrictions are set on Bayesian
networks. For example, the requirement on the causality of
events leads to using causal networks instead of generic
Bayesian networks.
1) Method Description: A Bayesian network is a proba-
bilistic graphical model that represents the variables and the
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Fig. 4. Simple Bayesian Attack Graph illustrating probability computations
(inspired by [50]).
graph with nodes as the discrete or continuous random vari-
ables and edges as the relationships between them. The nodes
maintain the states of the random variables and conditional
probability form.
There are several equivalent definitions of a Bayesian net-
work. Bayesian network is usually represented as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG). Each node represents a variable that
has a certain set of states. The edges represent the causal
relationships between the nodes. Formally, let G = (V,E)
be a DAG, and let X = (Xv)vV be a set of random variables
indexed by V . A Bayesian Network consists of a set of
variables and a set of direct edges between variables. Each
variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states. The
variable and direct edge form a DAG. To each variable A with
parents B1, B2...Bn, there is attached a conditional probability
table P (A|B1, B2...Bn).
An example of a Bayesian attack graph is shown in Fig-
ure 4 [50]. We can derive that the Bayesian network models
an activity of an attacker (D), who is likely to use one of
the buffer overflow exploits (B, C) to get access to a server
(A). Probability tables are attached to each node informing us
about the probability related to the exploit that the attacker will
likely use and what is the probability of a successful exploit.
Further extensions or constraints are used for specific
purposes, including cyber security. For example, Bayesian
attack graphs is an attack graph in the form of the Bayesian
network [32]. A causal network is a special case of a Bayesian
network which explicitly requires the relationships in the
network to be causal [12].
In order to create a Bayesian network or a Bayesian attack
graph, the list of events, causal dependencies between events,
and the probability of transitions between events are required.
Building the model requires either expert knowledge, or it can
be trained using data mining or machine learning. Typically,
the probability tables are calculated from the training datasets
or historical records. Structure learning, parameter learning,
and unobserved variable inference are the main tasks of
building the network.
Alert prediction using Bayesian networks or Bayesian attack
graphs uses probabilities depicted in the model. The event
with the highest posterior probabilities is the most probable
to appear in the future. For practical purposes, a threshold is
required to filter out predicted alerts with low probability. If the
probability of the predicted event is higher than the threshold,
the predicted event can be reported, and appropriate defense
mechanisms can be set.
2) Literature Review: A fundamental contribution is re-
search work by Qin and Lee from 2004 [12], which remain
a recommended reading even today. The authors presented
an approach to attack plan recognition and prediction of
upcoming attacks based on predefined attack plans. According
to their proposal, a causal network is constructed from low-
level alerts. Subsequently, probabilistic inference is conducted
to evaluate the likelihood of the next attack step. Their
approach was evaluated using DARPA’s Grand Challenge
Problem datasets. However, only limited results are presented.
A drawback of their work is that it requires a library of attack
plans, from which the causal network is derived. Thus, input
from a human expert is needed. The authors acknowledge this
as a challenge for future work. They also stated that there is
a need to distinguish between the deceptive plan and the real
goal of the attack and also attacks conducted by one attacker
and a group of collaborating attackers. These issues remain
open research problems even today.
Similarly to the situation with attack graphs, methods based
on Bayesian networks peaked in late 2000’ and are not getting
that much attention lately. Wu et al. [31] in 2012 proposed
minor updates to building Bayesian networks from attack
graphs for attack predictions. The authors propose to include
the presence of vulnerabilities and three environmental factors
into the Bayesian networks to reflect the potential impact of
predicted attacks. The environmental factors are the value
of assets in the network, the utilization of the host in the
network, and the attack history. However, the research work
only outlines the work and does not include any results.
Ramaki et al. [32] proposed a real-time alert correlation
and prediction framework in 2015. The framework has two
modes, online and offline. In the offline mode, a Bayesian
attack graph is constructed from low-level alerts. In the online
mode, the most probable next step of the attacker according
to BAG is predicted. The authors evaluated their approach
using the DARPA 2000 dataset. The accuracy of prediction
was observed to be increasing with the length of the attack
scenario. Thus, accuracy ranged from 92.3% when processing
the first attack step to 99.2% when processing the fifth attack
step.
Recently, Okutan et al. [33] included signals unrelated to
the target network into the attack prediction method based
on the Bayesian network. The signals are mentions of attacks
on Twitter or the current number of attacks from Hackmaged-
don [51]. The results show that the prediction accuracy ranges
from 63 % to 99 %, which makes it a promising approach.
Huang et al. [34] in 2018 involved attack prediction using
the Bayesian network in their framework for assessing cyber
attacks in cyber-physical systems. However, there are no




Another common approach to predicting attacks based on
model-checking prediction methods is using Markov models.
Markov models form a popular category of models, including
well-known examples of Markov chains and Hidden Markov
Models (HMM). Markov models are often represented as
a graph, which makes methods based on them similar to
the methods based on attack graphs and Bayesian networks.
Contrary to previously described approaches, Markov mod-
els operate well in the presence of unobservable states and
transitions, which removes the dependency of intrusion de-
tection and attack prediction methods on possessing complete
information. This allows for successful intrusion detection and
attack prediction even if some attack steps were undetected or
cannot be completely inferred.
1) Method Description: There are several variants of
Markov models used for attack prediction, Hidden Markov
models (HMM), Variable-length Markov models (VLMM),
and Variable-order Markov models (VOMM). In this section,
we show how to construct the model and predict an attack
using an HMM. VLMM and VOMM, however, share the
same theoretical background and their utilization for attack
prediction is very similar. HMM is a statistical model where
the system being modeled is assumed to be a Markov process
with unobserved (hidden) states. Hence, we can not observe
the state of a model directly, but only the outputs dependent
on the current state.
Consider having attack sequences consisting of classes such
as enumeration, host and service probing, exploitation, etc.
These events may be detected by an IDS, and thus the alerts
will be raised. From the perspective of HMMs, the alerts are
observable outputs of attack classes. Keep in mind that not all
the events can be detected by an IDS. In order to construct
an HMM from the attack sequences, we need to determine
the number of states in the model, the number of distinct
observation symbols per state, the state transition probability
distribution, and the initial state distribution [15]. The number
of states is the number of attack classes. The observation
symbols represent IDS alerts. State transition and observation
probabilities are extracted from historical records or by an
expert.
HMMs are often visualized as graphs. In cyber security,
attack classes are the nodes, observation symbols are the
edges, and the probabilities are weights of the edges. Figure 5
shows an example of HMM used for attack prediction [35].
We can see four states representing the attacker’s progress
from a normal state (nothing is happening) to a successful
compromise.
When having a sequence of attack classes, there is a need
to predict the next activity of an attacker, i.e., the next element
in the sequence. Intuitively, there is a need to find the most
likely path from the current state node. The most likely path
provides a sequence of attack classes that are the predicted
actions of the attacker. To eliminate false positives, it is
recommended to set a probability threshold so that lower
probabilities are discarded, and such paths are not considered
for further actions [15].
Normal Attempt Progress Compromise
Fig. 5. Hidden Markov Model states for predicting cyber attacks (inspired
by [35]).
2) Literature Review: The methods based on Markov mod-
els appeared along with the methods based on attack graphs
and Bayesian networks in late 2000’. Farhadi et al. [15] in
2011 proposed a complex framework for alert correlation and
prediction. In this work, sequential pattern mining is used to
extract attack scenarios, which are then represented using a
Hidden Markov model that is used for attack plan recognition.
Authors claim that their work is the first to use an unsupervised
method of attack plan recognition. Research works like this
one are part of a trend in research on predictions in cyber
security that overcomes a major drawback of previous works.
Instead of relying on a predefined model constructed or super-
vised by a human expert, it incorporates unsupervised methods
of data mining or machine learning. Thus, we selected this
work as a recommended reading to illustrate this transition.
Sendi et al. [35] in 2012 proposed a method of intrusion
prediction in real time that uses HMMs. The multi-step attacks
are the prime interest in this work. An experimental evaluation
shows how their method can predict multi-step attacks, which
is especially useful for preventing the attacker from gaining
control over more and more hosts in the network.
Shin et al. [36] in 2013 proposed an advanced probabilis-
tic approach for network-based IDS (APAN), which uses a
Markov chain to model unusual events in the network traffic
and to forecast intrusion. Contrary to other methods based on
Markov models, this method processes network anomalies and,
thus, is not aiming at predicting the next move of an attacker
like other model-checking approaches.
Zhang et al. [37] in 2014 discussed differences between
trained and untrained Markov models as applied to detection
and prediction of multi-step attacks. The authors first train
the HMM by Baum-Welch algorithm. Consequently, attack
scenario corresponding to an alert is found using a Forward al-
gorithm. Finally, the next possible attack sequence is predicted
using the Viterbi algorithm. The approach was evaluated using
DARPA 2000 dataset. Trained HMMs scored better than their
untrained counterparts in both recognition and prediction.
Kholidy et al. published a series of three papers on attack
predictions in cloud systems in 2014. First, attack predic-
tion models for intrusion detection systems in the cloud are
proposed [38]. Subsequently, the utilization of finite state
HMMs for predicting multi-stage attacks in the cloud is
discussed [39]. Finally, the intrusion prediction model with
finite context with a probabilistic suffix tree is described [40].
Abraham and Nair [41] proposed predictive cybersecurity
framework based on Markov models for exploitability anal-
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ysis. The authors use CVSS data to assess the life-cycle of
vulnerabilities and predict their impact on the network.
Most recently, Bar et al. [42], [43] in 2016 used data
from honeypots for complex modeling of attack propagation
using Markov chains. Several frequent patterns of attack
propagation were observed and described in details. However,
the prediction of the next attacked honeypot is only briefly
mentioned and left for future work.
D. Game Theory
Game-theoretical approaches to attack prediction are similar
to the graphical model-checking approaches discussed earlier.
The game is used as a model of interaction between an attacker
and a defender. Contrary to the graphical model-checking
approaches, game-theoretical methods aim to find the best
strategy for the players instead of the most frequent attack
progression observed in historical data. Thus, game-theoretical
approaches seem promising especially for prediction of ad-
vanced attacker’s activity.
1) Method Description: Game theory is a mathematical
tool designed for analysis of an interaction between subjects
with often conflicting objects. The basic assumptions in game
theory are that participants are rational (they pursue their
objectives) and that they reason strategically (they take into
account their knowledge or expectations of other participants).
A game is a model of strategic interaction. The game
consists of 1) a finite set N of players (usually attacker and
defender/administrator in context of network security), 2) a
nonempty set of actions Ai for each player i ∈ N , 3) a payoff
function ui for each player i ∈ N , that assigns each outcome
a ∈ ×j∈NAj a utility of player i.
A strategy of a player is a function that provides a player’s
action for each situation in which the player should make
a decision. We distinguish between two types of strategies.
Pure strategies provide a single action for each situation. By
contrast, a mixed strategy assigns each situation a probability
distribution over the set of player’s actions. The concept of
a game solution in game theory is not explicit. The most
commonly used solution concept is a Nash equilibrium [52].
In Nash equilibrium, both players have chosen such strategies,
which neither of them would benefit by deviating from his
strategy. Finding the Nash equilibria of a game is often com-
putationally intractable [53]. However, algorithms with lesser
computational complexity approximating the Nash equilibria
are available for some types of games [54], [55].
There are various classes of game models that can be used
for attack prediction. One such classification distinguishes
extensive vs. strategic games. In a game in strategic form,
each player chooses his action only once, and the actions of
all players are made simultaneously. By contrast, in games in
extensive form, the players make the choice of action multiple
(possibly infinitely many) times simultaneously or in turns
and the players may include all available information in their
decision at the time the decision is made.
Alternatively, we distinguish games with imperfect vs. per-
fect information. In extensive games with perfect information,
at any stage of the game, all players are informed about each
other’s moves in previous turns. Contrary, if all information
about past moves is not available to all player, the extensive
form game is said to have imperfect information.
2) Literature Review: Lisý et al. [44] used a zero-sum
game in extensive form with imperfect information to infer
the attacker’s plan in situations when the attacker tries to
actively mislead the defender about his goals. They assume the
targets and their respective value for the attacker are known
as well as the set of all attack scenarios. Every round of
the game, the attacker chooses an action, and the defender
chooses a sensor from a given set of sensors. Each sensor has
given the capability of detecting various attacker’s actions.
The attacker tries to reach the most valuable target while
avoiding detection and misleading the defender about the
ultimate goal. The defender tries to guess as many of the
attacker’s moves as possible. They present an algorithm to
compute an approximation of the Nash equilibria. Another
presented algorithm each turn identifies the most probable
scenarios, thus enabling the defender to guess not only the
attacker’s next action but also his ultimate goal.
Pı́bil et al. [45] focus on predicting the target of the attacker
rather than his next move. They consider the zero-sum finite
game in extensive form with imperfect information between
the attacker and defender. The defender selects the deployment
of honeypots, mainly how valuable they appear to the attacker.
The attacker chooses which target to attack. They consider two
scenarios; in the first scenario, the attacker has no information
other than the perceived value of the target, while in the second
scenario the attacker can probe a few targets and receive
noisy information of their type. The Nash equilibria of this
game help the defender to best disguise the honeypots and the
attacker to select which targets will he attack.
Abdlhamed et al. [9] in 2016 proposed a system for intrusion
prediction in a cloud computing environment. Their system is
designed to leverage the problem that theoretic models such
as game theory can be highly unreliable with insufficient or
uncertain input data. Their system first tries to match the
situation to build attack models and scenarios. If the match is
sufficient, the system assumes the situation is covered by the
theoretical game theory based model and applies the model’s
prediction. In case the input data are not sufficient, statistical
methods are applied for prediction. Thus, this work poses as
an example of using a combination of different approaches.
V. METHODS BASED ON CONTINUOUS MODELS
The second group of methods is using continuous models,
namely time series and grey models, as discussed in appro-
priate subsections. Such approaches are in most cases suitable
for forecasting network security situation. Common results are
forecasts of the numbers, volumes, and composition of attacks
in the network and their distribution in time. Alternatively,
spatiotemporal patterns in time series may be used to predict
cyber attacks. A summary of methods and research papers can
be found in Table III.
A. Time Series
Time series pose a very interesting tool for predictive
analysis, that is used in various fields, including cyber security.
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF PREDICTION METHODS, PART II – APPROACHES BASED ON CONTINUOUS MODELS.
Time series (Section V-A)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Park et al. [56] (FORE) 2012 Time series and linear regression Live 1.8 time faster reaction to worms
Zhan et al. [57] 2013 Time series (FARIMA) Live (honeypot) Attack predictions up to 5 hours ahead
Silva et al. [58] 2014 Time series (PBRS/EWMA) Live (honeynet) up to 57.8 % accuracy, limited to burst
attacks (brute-forcing and DDoS)
Abdullah, Pillai et al. [59], [60] 2015 Time series (GARMA + ARMA) Live data (honeynet) Limited set of atack types considered
Freudiger et al. [61] 2015 Time series (EWMA) Dshield Collaborative blacklisting
Chen et al. [62] 2015 Spatiotemporal patterns Live (honeynet) Discussison of found attack patterns
Zhan et al. [63] 2015 Time series (FARIM + GARCH) +
Extreme values
Live (honeypot) 70 %–87.9 % accuracy
Sokol et al. [64] 2017 Time series (AR(1)) Live (honeynet) 95 % certainty, finding simple models
Werner et al. [65] 2017 Time series (ARIMA) Hackmageddon 14.1 %–21.2 % accuracy
Dowling et al. [66] 2017 Temporal variances Live (honeynet) Attack type predictability
Okutan et al. [67] 2017 Time series (ARIMA) Live data (anonymized) Unconventional resources (Twitter, etc.)
Grey Models (Section V-B)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Lin et al. [68] 2014 Grey models DARPA 1998 Supported by immunity model
Leau and Manickam [69], [70] 2016 Grey models DARPA 1999 & 2000 More robust than standard grey models
It is worth mentioning that time series are commonly used in
anomaly detection. A time series represent common network
traffic patterns. Subsequently, the deviations that do not match
with the expected values of network traffic in a given moment
is proclaimed as an anomaly. Although the terminology and
methods of anomaly detection are similar to attack prediction,
the two use cases are substantially different. Hence, research
on anomaly detection is not presented here.
1) Method Description: A time series is a set of consecutive
data points indexed in time order, often plotted in line charts.
A time series is constructed from historical records of an
observed phenomenon; in our case, it can be attacker’s activity
or a network security situation state represented in a numerical
value. There are a plethora of methods for dealing with time
series analysis that can be used to predict the values of a time
series in the near future. A significant number of approaches
employ moving average, a calculation to analyze the data by
creating a series of averages of subsets of the time series.
Variants of moving average analyses include simple moving
averages (SMA) [9] or exponential weighted moving average
(EWMA) [58], [61]. The weights and exponential smoothing
allow a prediction method to better reflect the nature of the
input time series, e.g., seasonality of network traffic (day-
night differences, etc.). A recent trend is using autoregressive
moving averages (ARMA, ARIMA) [65], [67]. See Figure 6
for an example of time series forecasting with moving average
and forecasting confidence limits.
2) Literature Review: Using time series for cyber attack
prediction and forecasting is a somewhat recent idea, com-
pared to other approaches. A precursor to time series methods
appeared in 2012 when Park et al. [56] proposed FORE, a
mechanism for predicting ”cyber weather” using regression
analysis. The tasks of FORE is to forecast unknown Internet
worms by analyzing the randomness in the network traffic. The
concept of the work is that the presence of work in the network
traffic increases network traffic randomness. The forecasts are










Fig. 6. Time series forecasting with moving average.
From there on, Zhan et al. [57] proposed a statistical
framework based on time series analysis of honeypot data in
2013. In 2014, Silva et al. [58] created a model for predicting
burst attacks, i.e., brute-forcing and DoS, that is based on time
series. The authors compared pseudo-random binary sequences
(PBRS) and exponential weighted moving average (EWMA)
to predict the beginning of bursts. In an evaluation using a
honeynet, it was shown that the attacks could be predicted
with an accuracy ranging from 17.4 % to 57.8 % with a moving
average of around 5-10 hours. Many research papers appeared
in 2015. Abdullah, Pillai et al. [59], [60] proposed using
GARMA and ARMA time series evaluated on live data from
a honeynet. Freudiger et al. [61] worked on controlled data
sharing that would lead to collaborative predictive blacklisting.
Part of this contribution proposed the use of EWMA time
series for predictions and evaluation on Dshield data. Chen et
al. [62] relied on time series in their work on predicting cyber
attacks using spatiotemporal patterns. Zhan et al. compared
long-term and short-term predictions of cyber attacks using
time series (FARIMA and GARCH) and extreme values with
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interesting results, up to 87.9 % prediction accuracy was
achieved 1 hour ahead of time of an attack. In 2017, Werner
et al. [65] used ARIMA time series to predict the intensity of
cyber attacks, i.e., expected number of attacks in the next day.
Sokol et al. [64] used AR(1) model to predict attacks against
a honeynet. A similar yet simplistic method using random
sampling in temporal variance was proposed by Dowling et
al. [66] to attack type predictability. Recent work by Okutan
et al. [67] uses a broad range of unconventional signals, such
as Twitter events, to improve forecasting of security incidents
using a time series and ARIMA model.
Time series were already mentioned in Section IV-D, where
a combined approach using game theory and supported by
time series analysis was presented [9]. Machine learning
methods (see Section VI) may also use time series to train
classifiers [71].
B. Grey Models
The Grey Models are typically used for predicting cyber
security situations and define yet another example of method-
ologies which employ a continuous mathematical model. The
Grey Theory was first presented by Deng in 1982 [72]. In a
grey theory terminology, a situation with no information is
defined as black and a situation with complete information
as white. Since both options are idealized, the real world
problems are somewhere in the middle, in a situation defined
as grey. Thus, a grey situation can be modeled using a Grey
Model (GM).
1) Method Description: The most widely used grey fore-
casting models are GM(1, 1) and its modification Grey-
Verhulst model. The forecasting ability of these models is
limited to predicting next members of a time series. It is most
suitable for short-term prediction based on a small sample of
data. In network security, authors usually measure the network
security situation and predict its next value.
Let X0 = {x0(1), . . . , x0(n)} be a sequence of length n
whose next value will be predicted, usually a time series. First
the Accumulating Generation Operation (1-AGO) is applied




0(i). By applying accumulation operation,
the influence of random fluctuations present in the original
sequence is weakened. Moreover the original sequence can be
easily reconstructed as x0(k) = x1(k)− x1(k− 1) for k > 1,
x0(1) = x1(1).
The model is created for the sequence X1. Different mod-
ifications use different models. The original GM(1, 1) model
assumes the data satisfy the differential equation
dx1(k)
dk
+ ax1(k) = b.
The model works best for data with exponential growth.
The Grey-Verhulst model, which is more appropriate for data
following S-curve [73] assumes a differential equation
dx1(k)
dk
+ ax1(k) = b[x1(k)]2
The model parameters a, b are estimated using least squares
method from the sample data. The solution of the differential
equation x̂1(k) is computed and the future values of the
sequence X0 are predicted as x̂0(k+1) = x̂1(k+1)− x̂1(k)
for k ≥ n. The various methods based on Grey model usually
use modified model or extend the model on error prediction.
2) Literature Review: Preliminary work on network secu-
rity situation forecasting using Grey models from 2006 to 2014
is covered in a survey by Leau and Manickam [6]. Thus, we
only surveyed later research works.
In 2014, Lin et al. [68] introduced their definition of the
network security situation. They claim the network defense
is similar to an immunity system; the severity of a situation
is proportional to the strength of the response. The authors
compute the network security situation based on the num-
ber of defensive measures currently in place. They improve
the prediction by considering various factors, that influence
network security situation. The most influential factors are
selected using the method of grey entropy correlation analysis,
and the Kalman filter is applied to improve the prediction.
In 2016, Leau and Manickam [69] endeavor to overcome the
limitations of GM(1, 1) and Grey-Verhulst models, namely
that they are accurate only for specific input series. In their
work, they introduce an adaptive Grey-Verhulst model that is
robust as applied to wider types of time series. The modifica-
tion consists of an extension of the underlining Grey-Verhulst
model. While the original model from which the differential
equation is derived assumes that x0(k)+az1(k) = b(z1(k))2,
where z1(k) = 12x
1(k) + 12x
1(k − 1), the modified version




The value of z1(k) is derived so that the error due to different
shapes of the original time series is reduced as much as
possible. The same authors also introduce [70] an adaptive
Grey-Verhulst-Kalman prediction model, which utilizes the
adaptive Grey-Verhulst model from their previous work and
improves it by applying the Kalman filter to predict the next
residuum, thus increasing the prediction accuracy.
VI. MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA MINING METHODS
Machine learning (ML) is gaining popularity in the research
community in wide areas of exploration, and cyber security is
no exception [89]. It contains a vast landscape of approaches
and methods, such as neural networks and support vector
machines, which makes it difficult to properly categorize ma-
chine learning in terms of attack prediction methods. Machine
learning is closely tied to data mining [89], which was already
mentioned several times in this work. Typically, data mining
was exploited to create a model used in attack prediction, e.g.,
an attack graph [14] and a Markov model [15]. The utilization
of data mining in this context is intended to overcome a
major drawback of model-based attack prediction models, i.e.,
the dependency on models provided by a security expert [3].
However, data mining does not directly influence the method
itself. Thus, in this section, we only list approaches that
make direct use of machine learning. Methods that are only




COMPARISON OF PREDICTION METHODS, PART III – APPROACHES BASED ON MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA MINING.
Neural Networks (Section VI-B1)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Zheng et al. [74] 2012 BP neural network KDD99 Modular system, very brief discussion
Chen et al. [75] 2013 Recurrent neural network Live (honeypot) Old data (2000-2001)
Zhang et al. [76] 2013 BP and RBF neural networks Custom dataset 84.2-85.42 % accuracy, BP faster than RBF
Xing-zhu [77] 2016 RBF Neural network DARPA 1998 Intrusion prediction
Zhang et al. [78] 2016 Wavelet neural network Testbed Optimized by genetic algorithms
He et al. [79] 2017 Wavelet neural network DARPA (not specified) Minor improvements, discusses drawbacks
Support Vector Machines (Section VI-B2)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Cheng and Lang [80] 2012 Support Vector Machine Live Alternative to NSSA forecasting based on
neural networks
Jayasinghe et al. [81] 2014 Support Vector Machine Live (webpages) Limited to drive-by download attacks
Uwagbole et al. [82], [83] 2017 Support Vector Machine Custom dataset Limited to SQL injection attacks
Data Mining (Section VI-B3)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Fachkha et al. [84] 2012 Frequent pattern mining,
association rule mining
CAIDA network telescope Global scope given by CAIDA’s network
telescope size
Kim and Park [85] (CARMA) 2014 Sequence mining Live Thorough reasoning behind the results




Other Machine Learning Methods (Section VI-B4)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Soska and Christin [87] 2014 Decision-tree classifiers Live detects websites that will turn malicious,
66 % TP and 17 % FP rate





90 % TP and 10 % FP rate
Shao et al. [18] 2016 Rule mining, clustering Proof-of-concept User behavior analysis, identification of po-
tentially problematic user groups
Veeramachaneni et al. [88]
(AI2)
2016 Combination of supervised
and unsupervised methods
Live Improved detection rates compared to unsu-
pervised methods alone
A. Method Description
There is a number of approaches and methods of machine
learning that can be used to predict future events such as
cyber attacks. Thus, we describe the basics of neural networks
herein as they are the most often used machine learning
method derived from the surveyed papers. Neural networks
were prominent at the initial rise of machine learning but were
later replaced by Support Vector Machines (SVM) that offered
lower computational complexity and shorter learning times.
However, with the novel findings, the neural networks are once
again gaining on popularity [89]. Readers that are interested
in more details related to machine learning applications in
cyber security are kindly referred to a survey by Buczak and
Guven [89].
There are common steps in applying machine learning
methods. Usually, it consists of two phases, training and
testing. During the training phase, appropriate examples from
the learning dataset are learned. Consequently, in the testing
phase, new data are processed by the model and the machine
learning method produces results, such as predicted contin-
uations of attack sequences. In practice, however, there is
also a validation phase between the training and testing. In
the validation phase, another dataset is used to evaluate how
well was the model trained or which of the models should be
used for testing. For example, several neural networks may
be constructed in the learning phase, each with a different
number of layers and nodes, which differ in the prediction
accuracy and effectiveness. An important aspect of machine
learning is supervision. Either a model is trained autonomously
and thus is referred to as unsupervised unsupervised, or the
input data are fully or partially labeled by a human expert and
thus dubbed as supervised or semi-supervised learning. The
problem of identifying the classes and class attributes in the
data, i.e., inputs of the machine learning methods, is known
as feature extraction [89].
Artificial neural network (ANN) is a form of distributed
computing inspired by biological neural networks, i.e., neurons
in a brain. It is composed of simple processing units and
synapses between them. It is common to visualize ANN in
a graph as illustrated in Figure 7, where nodes are units and
edges are synapses. A subset of units acts as input nodes and
another subset as output nodes. The remaining nodes receive
the signals transmitted from their input nodes, process the
signals, and transmit it to their output nodes. The nodes can
be weighted, and the whole network is typically structured
in layers. Further, the nodes may have their own state or a
threshold, which retransmits only the signals of a given level.
The weights, thresholds, and synapses are established during
the learning phase and may vary as the learning proceeds. The
inputs are sent as signals to the input nodes, and the output
nodes then provide the results.
B. Literature Review
The literature review of machine learning and data mining
methods was structured as follows. Three subsections are






































Fig. 7. Artificial neural network for network security situation prediction
(inspired by [90]).
works. Those are neural networks, support vector machines,
and data mining. The remaining research works are discussed
after that. It is hard to properly categorize this group of
methods, because of frequent combinations of approaches or
uniquely used approach.
1) Neural Networks: A number of papers deal with the
application of machine learning to predict network security
situation for the needs of NSSA. These papers are rather short
and focus on the theoretical background of NSSA modeling
and forecasting, such as the mathematical formalization of
the problem. However, the proposed approaches are rarely
supported by experimental evaluation and, thus, provide lim-
ited value for security practitioners. Nevertheless, the common
statement that NSSA is of vital interest is unquestionable. Vari-
ous types of neural networks are discussed in these papers, and
herein, a summary is subsequently provided for completeness
purposes. The first papers started to appear in 2008, and the
work continues till now. In 2012, Zheng et al. [74] discussed
using back-propagation neural networks. Zhang et al. [76]
in 2013 compared back-propagation and radial basis function
neural networks and Chen et al. [75] proposed using small-
world echo state network, which is a kind of recurrent neural
network. Zhang et al. [78] proposed using wavelet neural
networks in 2016. Most recently, He et al. [79] proposed using
a mixed wavelet-based neural network.
Neural networks were also used for intrusion prediction in
2016 by Xing-zhu [77]. The research work is, in essence, simi-
lar to the works on network security situation forecasting, only
the motivation is focused more towards predicting particular
intrusion.
2) Support Vector Machine: Cheng and Lang [80] sug-
gested using support vector regression machine to forecast
network security situation, although this work mostly presents
an alternative to the neural network-based methods. Apart
from a different classifier, their work is, in essence, similar
to research performed in this field using neural networks.
Support vector machines proved suitable for predicting very
specific attacks. Jayasinghe et al. [81] in 2014 predicted
drive-by downloads by monitoring and analyzing bytecode
stream produced by a web browser. Uwagbole et al. [82] in
2017 proposed a predictive system based on machine learning
to predict SQL injection attacks. The system uses SVM to
classify web request so that the SQL injection can be predicted
before the web page starts a malicious database query. The
work is accompanied by another paper on generating corpus
a for the learning phase [83].
3) Data Mining: Fachkha et al. [84] in 2012 investigated
the data from darknet, a large unassigned IP address space,
to profile the darknet traffic and corresponding cyber threats.
Frequent pattern mining and association rule mining were used
to find hidden correlations between events in darknet traffic.
The found patterns and rules are then proposed to be used
for predicting events in the darknet traffic and cyber threats in
general. Due to the nature of the darknet, in this case, CAIDA
darknet that represents 1/256 of the IPv4 address space, the
results of such threat prediction have global scope.
Kim and Park [85] in 2014 used data mining to build the
attack graph for attack prediction. The authors used sequential
association rule mining to reflect the order of events. Although
the paper indicates that the mined sequences are used for
constructing the attack graph, the paper does not particularly
specify how is this actually done but rather focus on the
sequence mining. Thus, it was not categorized under attack
graph-based models in Section IV-A. Sequence mining was
also used in recent work by Husák and Kašpar [86], in which
the authors mined sequential rules from cyber security alerts
contained in a large-scale alert sharing platform. Contrary
to [85], the emphasis was put on analyzing live data from real
networks and evaluating the suitability of such an approach in
practice.
4) Other Machine Learning Methods: In 2014, Soska and
Christin [87] used machine learning to automatically detect
vulnerable websites before they turn malicious. Traffic statis-
tics, filesystem structure, and website content were used to
train an ensemble of decision-tree classifiers. The authors
performed a year-long evaluation with promising results of
66% true positive rate and 17% false positive rate, which is a
good result among methods evaluated in practice.
Liu et al. [71] in 2015 characterized the extent to which
cyber security incidents can be predicted. The research work is
focused on data breaches, which are predicted using a random
forest classifier against more than 1,000 real data breaches.
The number of features used for training the classifier is
remarkable, 258 features were collected from organizations’
networks. The features either describe mismanagement symp-
toms (misconfigured DNS, BGP, etc.) or malicious activity
time series (spam, phishing, network scans, etc.). The resulting
90% true positive rate and 10% false positive rate only
underline the extent of this work. Due to the significant extent
of the work, we list this work as a recommended reading.
Veeramachaneni et al. [88] in 2016 presented AI2, a
machine learning system for attack prediction that includes
human input. First, the first authors use an ensemble of
unsupervised outlier detection methods, including principal
component analysis and autoencoders. Subsequently, feedback
from an analyst is obtained and supervised learning module
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is used. The model is constantly refined as more feedback is
gathered, which leads to promising results. The AI2 improves
the detection rate more than three times on average while
reducing false positive rate fivefold, compared to unsupervised
methods alone.
Shao et al. [18] in 2016 used user behavior analysis to
predict cyber attacks with a motivation to include the reasoning
behind the attacks. User security rating is derived from his/her
consistency (usage patterns), accuracy (frequency of mistakes),
and constancy (how long the user displays good online behav-
ior). Rule mining is then used to find hidden relations in the
behavior patterns. Finally, unsupervised clustering, such as k-
means, and manual filtration of the results are used to identify
groups of users that are prone to malicious operations.
VII. OTHER APPROACHES
In this section, we discuss the fourth group of prediction
methods, methods that are hard to categorize properly or that
are highly specialized in terms of a use case or a method
used. The full list of approaches and papers is presented in
Table V. There is no common background to these methods,
so we only provide the literature review, and briefly explain
the background there.
1) Similarity-based Approaches: The first of the alterna-
tive approaches is based on similarity, mostly addressing the
problem of attacker’s intention recognition by calculating a
similarity metric with a previously observed attack. In 2012,
Jantan and Rasmi et al. [91], [92] proposed a model of
attack strategy that allows comparisons of the attack strategies.
The observed security alerts are expressed numerically, and
cosine similarity is applied to infer a similarity between
two attack strategies. It is worth mentioning that the same
authors have previously developed models based on Bayesian
networks [106].
In 2014, AlEroud and Karabatis [93] proposed an approach
to detect cyber attacks using semantic link network (SLN),
which utilizes contextual information of network flows and
alerts raised in response to them. Subsequently, SLN is used
to predict and detect malicious flows, focusing on multi-step
attacks, using similarity measures. The same authors recently
published a novel approach [94] based on contextual relation-
ships between cyber attacks and calculating their similarity.
In 2016, Jiang et al. [95] proposed an intrusion prediction
mechanism based on honeypot log similarity. System logs
from honeypots were first analyzed using association rule min-
ing to find useful implicit information and to select features.
Subsequently, the flows are mapped into metric space, and
distance calculation is used to identify flows that are most
similar to the known malicious flows, thus adding them to the
prediction list. This approach aims at reducing false positive
alarms and was evaluated in a live environment of a Taiwanese
academic network.
Recently, AlEroud and Alsmadi [96] used similarity to
predict and mitigate attacks in software-defined networks.
The network traffic is aggregated to flows, and the flows’
characteristics are subsequently compared to flow signatures
of known attacks. If a similarity is found between known
malicious flows and current flows, it is possible to predict
a continuation of the traffic and mitigate the attack.
2) DDoS Volume Forecasting: Deeply studied topics are the
DDoS attacks and predictions related to them. The predictions
of DDoS attacks focuses mostly on identifying the initial phase
of an attack, in which the volume of bogus network traffic
rises, and the prediction of the volume of the attack. The
volume of a DDoS attack is the most important feature of
such attacks. The metrics for DDoS volume are packet or byte
rate per second and the estimated number of compromised
machines involved in the attack. Knowing the attack volume
in advance tells us whether the target system or the network
can withstand the attack or if there is enough capacity for
defense, e.g., in scrubbing centers.
Since 2012, several authors have proposed their methods of
DDoS forecasting. Kwon et al. [97] used honeynets to capture
the initial phases of the DDoS attack and predict its size.
Later, they used statistical approaches to predict the DDoS
volume [98]. Fachkha et al. [99] proposed an approach based
on analysis of data from darknets. Olabelurin et al. [100]
improved the forecasting techniques by including entropy in
the calculations.
3) Evolutionary computing: A very recent approach to
forecast network security situation is based on belief rule base
(BRB) models and evolutionary algorithms, namely CMA-ES.
This approach emerged in 2016, and was since then described
and continuously improved by Hu et al. [101], [102] and Wei
et al. [103], including the improvements in network security
situation assessment [107]. BRB model includes a series of
belief rules and can be built from expert knowledge as well
as historical data. These might be subjective and inaccurate.
Subsequently, the covariance matrix adaption evolution strat-
egy (CMA-ES) is used to optimize the models the parameters
of BRB model, which can then forecast network security
situation. This novel approach seems very promising and
might be a good alternative to grey models, that were used for
the same purpose, as discussed in section V-B. Nevertheless,
this method is too novel, so that we cannot compare its impact,
e.g., by a number of citations.
4) Unconventional data sources: A novel trend in cyber
security predictions is using unconventional data sources. For
example, using DNS logs for attack prediction is present in
work by Mahjoub and Mathew [104] from 2015, who proposed
a principle called Spike Rank or SPRank, that detects domains
showing a sudden spike in DNS queries issued from millions
of clients worldwide towards OpenDNS resolvers. The spikes
were able to detect several malware campaigns as well as
phishing campaigns.
In addition, even non-technical data sources were consid-
ered for cyber attack prediction. Hernandez et al. [16] in
2016 performed sentiment analysis on Twitter to predict cyber
attacks. Sentiment analysis of social networks was also a
data source for Shu et al. [17] in 2018. Information foraging
for improving cyber attack predictions was also discussed by
Dalton et al. [105] in 2017. The authors, however, discuss
various strategies for information foraging and only briefly
mention the data sources with which they work.
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TABLE V
COMPARISON OF PREDICTION METHODS, PART IV – OTHER APPROACHES.
Similarity-based approaches (Section VII-1)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Jantan et al. [91],
Rasmi et al. [92]
2012,
2013
Similarity Proof-of-concept Reduced time and cost of intention recog-
nition in network forensics




Semantic links and similarity,
Contextual relationships
Synthetic dataset (IP flows),
DARPA (not specified)
Supported by machine learning,
missing temporal aspects
Jiang et al. [95] 2016 Similarity Live (honeynet) Supported by data mining
AlEroud and Alsmadi [96] 2017 Similarity Testbed (SDN) Evaluation limited to DoS prediction
DDoS volume forecasting (Section VII-2)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Kwon et al. [97], [98] 2012,
2017
Regression analysis and other
statistical methods
Live (honeypots) Framework was proposed first,
methods were added later
Fachkha et al. [99] 2013 Time series, liner regression CAIDA network telescope Backscatter analysis – global scope
Olabelurin et al. [100] 2015 Entropy forecasting Testbed Low false positive rate – 22.5%
Evolutionary computing (Section VII-3)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Hu et al. [101], [102],
Wei et al. [103]
2016-
2017
Belief rule base model,
evolutionary computing
Proof-of-concept Possible alternative to grey models for
network security situation prediction
Predictions based on unconventional data sources (Section VII-4)
Authors Year Approach/Model Evaluation Advantages and Limitations
Mahjoub and Mathew [104]
(SPRank)
2015 DNS anomalies Live Practical implementation,
not a research paper
Hernandez et al. [16] 2016 Twitter sentiment analysis,
linear regression
Live (Twitter) Thorough evaluation on real-world events
Dalton et al. [105] 2017 Information foraging in
publicly available data
Hackmageddon Only suggests improvements to existing
methods
Shu et al. [17] 2018 Twitter sentiment analysis,
logistic regression
Live (Twitter) Claims to predict attack, including its
type, against a particular target
VIII. EVALUATION AND LESSONS LEARNED
In this section, we evaluate the findings from the literature
review, and we answer the questions stated in the introduction.
In the first question, we were interested in what can be pre-
dicted in the cyber security domain. Although many use cases
were proposed, they can be reduced to several main use cases,
namely, attack projection and intent recognition, attack or
intrusion prediction, and security situation forecasting. These
were already described in details in Section II. The remaining
questions are summed up and answered in the following
subsection. First, we sum up the practical implications, i.e.,
how ready are the attack prediction methods to effectively
mitigate the attacks. Further, we take a closer look at the
evaluation of predictions and forecasts in cyber security. A
separate subsection is dedicated to metrics as there appeared to
be more approaches to set an evaluating set of metric. Finally,
we sum up open and resolved problems in the field.
A. Practical implications
Regarding the practical implications, the prime issues are
the accuracy and efficiency of predictions, but it is hard to
evaluate and compare the methods. Even setting the right
metrics is a problem as we have discussed further in this
section. However, high prediction accuracy is a good indicator
of a method’s usability in practice. As we inferred in the
literature review, there are many approaches that achieved high
accuracies of over than 90 % [15], [26], [32]. However, such
results were obtained when evaluating the approaches over
datasets. When we take a look at methods evaluated on live
network traffic, the prediction accuracies drop down to around
60–70 % [25], [33], [58], [63]. Some works show even worse
results, which indicates that the prediction accuracy in practice
is at the lower bounds.
Other practical aspects of predictions in practice are the time
criteria, namely the time needed to predict future events and
the time that remains to the predicted event. While older works
focused on the computational complexity of the prediction
algorithms, the field reports are scarce. However, modern
approaches are implemented to operate in real time with
minimal time delay [32], which effectively solves the problem.
Nevertheless, there is a need to find out how much time there
is to react to a predicted attack. Kholidy et al. [38], [39],
[40] claim that they can predict an attack forthcoming in 39
minutes, which is a promising result that leaves enough time
even for manual inspection of the predicted event. However,
there are no other works using the same metrics.
There are two other major issues common to many methods,
populating the knowledge base of the attacks and placing
attack prediction at the most suitable level of abstraction [3].
First, attack prediction methods require either a library of
attack plans completed by experts or a dataset of historical
records, from which the attack plans might be constructed.
Although both approaches are prone to errors and missing
attack descriptions, the use of machine learning and data min-
ing for model construction or direct prediction has prevailed in
recent years. However, if an automatically found attack plan is
going to be used in practice, one has to be careful to manually
inspect the results. Second, it is computationally demanding
to implement attack prediction at the network level, e.g., as
part of an IDS. Working with alerts from IDS is much more
scalable and flexible than working with packets or network
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flows. Additionally, it is convenient to combine alerts from
multiple IDS, e.g., a network-based and host-based, to get the
complete trace of the attack. However, correlating alerts from
heterogeneous sources adds additional complexity and stands
as a research problem of its own [108].
Suthaharan [109] states that the network intrusion detection
and prediction are time sensitive applications requiring highly
efficient Big Data techniques to tackle the problem on the fly.
Thus, it is proven that the data fall into the category of big data.
However, a new definition of big data is provided based on
three new parameters, cardinality, continuity, and complexity,
instead of traditional volume, variety, and velocity. Further,
the suitability of machine learning for big data is discussed.
Although methods based on Support Vector Machines provide
excellent accuracies, yet they are not suitable for big Data due
to their computational complexity. Representational learning
might be suitable for big data classification, but Machine
Lifelong Learning is recommended to be used.
B. Datasets
During the literature search, we encountered several datasets
that were often used for evaluation of the proposed meth-
ods. The most popular datasets were produced by MIT
Lincoln Labs and are generally recognized as the DARPA
datasets [110], [111]. There are three distinct datasets avail-
able: DARPA 1998, DARPA 1999, and DARPA 2000. DARPA
2000 further contains two attack scenarios, LLDOS 1.0 and
LLDOS 2.0.2; often only LLDOS 1.0 was used in attack
prediction method evaluations. Although the dataset is popular
and well documented, its main problem is its age; almost 20
years old dataset does not reflect current cyber security threats
and network traffic patterns.
ACM SIGKDD announced KDD Cup 1999 [112], a contest
on knowledge discovery from the cyber security data. In
this contest, DARPA 1998 dataset was used, although many
authors referenced the dataset as the KDD 1999 dataset. The
KDD Cup 1999 gained a lot of attention from numerous
researchers on the problem of intrusion detection as well
as attack prediction, thus allowing further comparisons of
various methods. However, substantial flaws in the dataset
were revealed in a thorough evaluation [113]. Thus, the
dataset is now considered unreliable and even harmful by
the community, although attempts for improving the dataset
quality were made [114]. Still, the dataset is used even in
recent works [9], [77].
Other datasets public datasets are used scarcely; the re-
searchers often crafted their own datasets [76] and evaluated
their proposed methods using these data. While some data are
obtained from real network traffic, which provides fresh data,
nevertheless it is quite problematic to publish such data due to
the needs of data anonymization. Another common option is
to design a testbed [22], [41], [100], which is often laborious
to set up, even if a proper description is provided. Thus,
custom datasets and testbeds seem suitable for evaluating the
proposed methods, but the reproducibility of such research is
often disputable.
There is one more common problem related to many
datasets used for evaluating methods of attack prediction, and
that is that the datasets are not designed for the purpose of
evaluating attack prediction. As Fava et al. stated back in
2008 [115], commonly known datasets, including the DARPA
datasets, are crafted for intrusion detection and, thus, do not
have the notion of attack tracks, i.e., there is no information
available on the attackers’ intentions or correlation of attack
steps. Thus, we can only confirm the accuracy of predicting
the next attacker’s move, but we cannot confirm or discard the
predicted attack plan.
C. Evaluation in live network
Evaluation of attack prediction in real-life scenarios is
challenging. It is hazardous to let the adversary execute an
intrusion in a real network only to evaluate the predictions. In
large networks, it is also problematic to get access to every
host that could be compromised. Nevertheless, several live data
sources were used, such as the data from DShield [116], a col-
laborative database of firewall logs, and Hackmageddon [51], a
compilation of cyber attack timelines and statistics. Very often,
researchers set up a honeypot to capture cyber security data
and use them to evaluate predictions. The main advantage of
honeypots is that they typically contain only malicious data.
However, they are not useful for studying advanced attack-
ers for the purpose of attack intention recognition. Finally,
darknets, large unassigned IP blacks, such as CAIDA network
telescope, were used for prediction in a global scale [84], [99].
In addition, the research on attack projection is often
accompanied by research on deception and network traffic
manipulation. The aim of deception in cyber security is to
guide the adversary to the target of defender’s choice, typically
a honeypot. Several researchers [117] continued their work
on attack prediction by proposing a deception system, which
prepares an attractive target for an attacker. For example,
if an adversary is supposed to exploit a certain service,
a honeypot emulating such service is set up in the target
network, either as a new target or as a clone of a real
system. If the predictions are correct and the honeypot setup
is quick enough, the attacker would exploit a honeypot, and
the attack can be studied. Manipulating the terrain for the
attacker was problematic mostly due to the need for rapid
deployment of honeypots and movement of targets as traffic
manipulation was too costly. However, recent development in
networking, namely in Software Defined Networks (SDN),
allowed easy traffic manipulation. The emerging field of SDN
thus began producing security-related frameworks focusing
on early-stage attack mitigation and traffic redirection, e.g.,
diverting the attack traffic to a honeypot instead of the original
target. AVANT-GUARD [118] is one of the early examples.
Combining such framework with attack prediction have been
proposed recently [96], and we expect more work on this topic
in near future.
D. Metrics
Setting the metrics to evaluate and compare attack predic-
tion methods is a challenging task. Naturally, we are interested
in the prediction accuracy as a prime indicator, but that may
rely on a given context and specific use case. In practical
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setups, we encountered the time criteria, such as prediction
efficiency and the time remaining to the predicted event.
Specific tasks, such as predictions based on specific attack
traits, require specific metrics. In this section, we summarize
and evaluate the metrics that are typically used in the literature.
The most important metric for evaluating prediction meth-
ods is their accuracy. As we have seen in many surveyed
papers, the authors often include the accuracy as the percent-
age of successfully predicted events or situations. However,
accuracy can be understood broadly and not all the papers use
it in a formal sense. Often, we can see confusion matrix as a
more descriptive metric of a prediction method. The confusion
matrix is used for the evaluation of intrusion detection. Hence
it is natural to use it in to evaluate prediction in cyber security
as well. However, there are several issues with the use of
confusion matrices. First, all the elements can be obtained
when evaluating a method over an annotated dataset, but
we can never be sure about the results when evaluating the
methods over live network data. Second, different methods
may use different criteria for true and false positives and
negatives. For example, if a certain exploit is predicted to
happen at a certain time on a specific host, but the attacker
exploits another target or the time of the attack is significantly
different, it is quite unclear whether we should consider
such events as true positives. Finally, in predictive analytics
and other fields of research, precision and recall values are
often used instead of the full confusion matrix, but calculated
from it. Precision is defined as tp/(tp + fp), while recall as
tp/(tp + fn). Precision and recall are favored to prevent the
accuracy paradox, i.e., a situation in which a predictive model
with a given level of accuracy may have greater predictive
power than models with high accuracy. These metrics were
often used to evaluate statistical methods and methods based
on machine learning, that we surveyed in the literature review.
To sum up, even though many surveyed papers use similar
metrics, they are hardly comparable due different works going
into different levels of details or using less formal definitions
of prediction accuracy.
Time criteria were used for evaluation of attack prediction
methods by Kholidy et al., who measured the time difference
between the prediction and the predicted attack [38], [39],
[40]. Thus, it is possible to estimate when is the attack going
to appear and how much time there is to prepare an appropriate
defense. On the one hand, the time delay between individual
attack steps can be inferred from the history of attacks in most
of the attack prediction methods. On the other hand, the time
criterion may be used as an indicator of the practical usability
of a prediction method. Thus, the time criterion should be
considered especially by practitioners who require some time
to react to a prediction.
E. Open and Resolved Problems
In the introduction and the literature survey in Sections IV–
VII, we have mentioned a number of problems associated
with attack prediction and forecasting. Many of these problems
were common to multiple attack prediction methods. For ex-
ample, if a method depends on an attack model, the model has
to be created and maintained. Similarly, if a security situation
is formally represented, there is a need to consider all the
factors contributing to it, which is not always straightforward.
Here we recapitulate minor problems which were successfully
approached and which remain open.
An example of a successfully resolved problem is the gener-
ation and maintenance of attack models or attack plan libraries.
The first attack prediction methods depended on attack plan
libraries that had to be populated by human experts. It was
tedious to formally represent all the possible attack paths and
if so, the model parameters, such as transition probabilities
in graph models, were hard to accurately be obtained. Often,
a model library built upon historical records were proposed,
which enabled realistic model parameters but still required
laborious manual work by experts. However, the introduction
of data mining into the cyber security domain created a
breakthrough for attack predictions. Using data mining, an
attack plan library can be constructed automatically and con-
tinuously updated. Data mining became especially popular for
constructing graph-based models, for example [14], [15], [32],
[37]. Data mining closely relates to machine learning, which
became another popular method to attack prediction. Machine
learning-supported methods do not need an external model
as they construct their own internal representation of cyber
security events and predictive rules during the learning phase.
However, human experts still play a vital role in constructing
attack models and consulting the results [88]. Further, a current
research trend is using deep machine learning, which has not
been observed in the surveyed literature yet. We expect to see
deep learning-based prediction methods in cyber security in
the near future.
Although the problems outlined earlier in this section have
been resolved, many other issues remain. The major issue
is how can prediction methods react to new trends in cyber
security, e.g., novel attack vectors and security paradigms.
Even though we cannot effectively predict 0-day attacks, its
attack progression is typically similar to some of the known
attacks, thus making the actual attack predictable to some
extent. However, how can we react to paradigm shifts and
novel attack vectors that arose with the development of the
Internet of Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, software-
defined networking (SDN), and other current trends? Indeed,
the first attempts to predict attacks in these novel paradigms
have already been proposed [34], [96]. Nevertheless, it is
definitely interesting to see how we can adapt the general
methods to work under emerging paradigms in networking
and security.
IX. CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK
In this paper, we presented a literature survey of attack
prediction methods. The problem was set in a context of re-
search on intrusion detection and cyber situational awareness.
A taxonomy of methods was provided, and each category
was described in detail and evaluated. The final evaluation
compared the methods and discussed related problems and
lessons learned. Herein, we conclude our findings on the
theory and practice of attack prediction and suggest future
events in the field.
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Three important findings emerged from the literature review.
First, many of the prediction methods in cyber security are
using a model to represent and project the future state of an
attack or a security situation. Although there is an apparent
division of the models given by their use case (attack pro-
jection more often uses discrete models, while forecasting
network security situation uses continuous models predomi-
nantly), the two main use cases often complement each other
and overlap in many cases. Second, we have seen many
new approaches based on data mining and machine learning,
which substantially change the state of the research in cyber
security predictions. Data mining resolves the dependence on
artificially provided prediction models, while machine learning
challenges the model-based approaches in general. Finally, we
have encountered many problems related to the evaluation
of predictions in cyber security. In the context of empirical
datasets, popular datasets are old, unreliable, and created for
other purposes, while evaluations in live networks are not
reproducible. We do not even have a common set of metrics
to compare the methods.
In the future, we are likely going to see further improve-
ments of attack prediction and its utilization in practice.
Keeping in mind that attack prediction is one step behind
intrusion detection, we outline a few directions in which
the research will be held. First, a transition in processing
the network data and alerts from batches to stream data
processing has already started, and we may expect further
utilization of Big Data analytics [109], [119]. Second, in the
near future, we are going to see research on attack prediction
in a collaborative environment, such as collaborative intrusion
detection systems or alert sharing platforms. Predicting attacks
in such an environment is a natural next step of the research
in this area [86], [120]. Finally, we are going to see more and
more data mining and machine learning in cyber security [89]
and the attack prediction is no exception. Specifically, we will
know better if machine learning alone can be used to learn
about the attacks and predict them at the same time, or if data
mining and machine learning will be used only to learn about
the attacks and the prediction will still use pattern matching.
To conclude this paper, the issue of attack prediction is an
interesting research problem that has been approached many
times by a number of researchers. Although many solutions
have been proposed, there is still no definite answer on
how to effectively and precisely predict cyber attacks. Attack
prediction is not yet used in practice and sometimes seen
as rather misleading [121], but it is still an open and an
imperative, desirable research problem [1], [3], [120].
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